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Summary 
 
The consequences of government debt on capital formation, financial wealth and labor 
are investigated in a small open economy with demographic heterogeneity. Two 
alternative types of demographics are considered: one with intragenerational 
heterogeneity of the ''savers-spenders'' (SS) type, and one with intergenerational 
heterogeneity of the OLG type. The effects of debt and the financial crowding out 
morphology strictly depend on the type of demographic heterogeneity. While in the SS 
economy debt crowds out capital, increases net foreign assets and contracts labor, in the 
OLG economy it generates the exact opposite results. Our results differ substantially 
from those observed in a closed economy, where the type of demographic heterogeneity 
plays no qualitative role for the effects of debt on wealth and factor employment. 
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1. Introduction
When Ricardian equivalence is violated, a debt-for-tax-swap policy displaces pri-
vate financial wealth from portfolios of savers. This occurs because the increase
in lump-sum taxation reduces aggregate saving by redistributing income across
heterogeneous agents. Financial crowding out may regard either physical capital
or net foreign assets. The structure of the setup considered plays a crucial role
for the precise morphology of the crowding out.
In a non-Ricardian closed economy, as physical capital is the only alternative
asset to goverment bonds, the displacement of wealth takes of necessity the form
of capital stock reduction. See, among others, Diamond (1965), Blanchard (1985)
and Elmendorf-Mankiw (1999).
In a non-Ricardian open economy, however, the introduction of foreign assets,
besides capital and government bonds, in the household asset menu can generate
non-obvious crowding out eﬀects.
Within an OLG small open economy with an inelastic labor supply, govern-
ment debt, for example, totally crowds out foreign bond holdings and exerts no
impact on physical capital; see Persson (1985).1 The rationale behind this result
is immediate to grasp: the world interest rate fixes capital intensity, which given
labor supply sets capital stock at an invariant debt level; this economy behaves de
facto like an economy with no capital. Therefore in such a setup, government debt
1Blanchard (1985) and Fried-Howitt (1988) obtain the same results in models with capital
in fixed supply.
impacts only on net claims on foreigners as the current account is the reflecting
mirror of aggregate saving.
Obstfeld (1990) discovers, by using a two-sector small open economy model
with overlapping infinitely-lived families that enter the economy continuously (as
in Weil, 1989), that public debt stimulates capital formation and displaces net
foreign assets. In the Obstfeld analysis, debt by altering relative prices impacts
on the supply side of the economy and hence exerts an eﬀects on capital stock
despite labor is supplied inelastically.2
Domestic debt manipulations are shown to reduce capital stock at home and
in the rest of the world in a two-country open economy model with disconnected
finite-lived agents; theoretical evidence is provided by Persson (1985), Obstfeld
(1990) and Obstfeld-Rogoﬀ (1996).
What are the eﬀects of government debt on capital formation and financial
wealth within a non-Ricardian one-sector small open economy when capital stock
is defrosted from the isolated world interest rate determination? Which assets are
the final receivers of the financial crowding out in such an economic environment?
In the absence of an answer from the literature, this paper tries to answer
these questions by considering demographic heterogeneity as a way to violate
Ricardian neutrality and endogenous labor-leisure choices as a way to allow capital
adjustment within a small open economy.
2Note that the Obstfeld findings hinge on the assumption that, in a ”tradable-nontradable”
economy, tradables are capital intensive goods.
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Two alternative types of demographics are considered, one with agents of the
same generations, i.e. ”synchronous” or intragenerational heterogeneity, and one
with agents that belong to diﬀerent generations, i.e. ”dyachronous” or intergen-
erational heterogeneity. The first type of heterogeneity is given by the ”savers-
spenders” (henceforth denominated SS) demographics; this structure, proposed
by Mankiw (2000), is populated by an immortal generation composed of no-
liquidity-constrained Barro-Ramsey agents, the savers, and liquidity-constrained
Keynesian agents, the spenders. The second type of heterogeneity studied in the
paper is represented by non-altruistic overlapping-generations demographics of
the Blanchard-Yaari type.
The analysis focuses on the steady state implications of government debt in a
small open economy with one sector whose demand-side is characterized by either
SS or OLG demographics.
In a closed economy, the two types of demographics considered here exhibit the
negative association between public debt and capital stock that mark the one-way
crowding out above mentioned.3
The violation of Ricardian neutrality in an infinitely-lived SS economy occurs
because debt, through lump-sum taxation levied on every agent, accomplishes a
redistribution of income across Barro-Ramsey and Keynesian individuals, leading
to irreversible changes in consumption, labor and consequently capital stock.4 If
3See, for example, Petrucci (2000), for the SS demographics, and Auerbach-Kotlikoﬀ (1987)
and Phelps (1994), for the OLG demographics.
4Note that within a SS economy agents that do not hold government bonds play the same
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plausible values of taste parameters are considered, higher debt is associated with
lower labor and capital.5
In a closed economy with finite-lived non-altruistic agents and endogenous
labor-leisure choices, higher government debt redistributes income through lump-
sum taxation between young and older generations (namely generations with dif-
ferent propensities to save), leading to lower aggregate saving and capital forma-
tion. The reduction of capital lowers in turn labor, output and hence consump-
tion.6
Therefore, from these theoretical results, one is tempted to infer mechanically
that the basic results obtained for a closed economy, i.e. the type of demographic
heterogeneity is unimportant for the morphology of the financial crowding out, can
be replicated for an one-sector small open economy having an adjustable capital.
The only diﬀerence is that within a small open economy the financial crowding
role in invalidating Ricardian equivalence that the ”new entrants” play in a non-altruistic OLG
economy.
5When labor supply is inelastic government debt is neutral in a SS economy (see Mankiw,
2000). Debt neutrality has in this case a mechanical reasoning rather than a proper economic
one, since it is entirely due to the ”modified golden rule” entrapment of capital stock.
However, when labor choices are endogenous, there are two dimensions of heterogeneity that
matter in a SS economy to have debt nonneutrality: the distinction between Ricardian and
Keynesian agents, on the one hand, and diﬀerences in tastes among agents for the consumption-
leisure trade-oﬀ, on the other hand. See Petrucci (2000).
6The hypothesis of endogenous labor decisions is qualitatively insignificant for the final eﬀects
of government debt on capital stock, output and factor prices in OLG closed economy setups.
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out, by a sort of physics’ principle of ”communicating vessels”, can be spread
over all the assets alternative to government bonds, i.e. capital and net claims
on foreigners. Thus we expect that a higher government debt lowers saving and
hence physical capital as well as net foreign assets, no matter what demographic
heterogeneity is.
This deduction is incorrect. We find that within a small open economy the
morphology of debt crowding out strictly depends on the type of demographic
heterogeneity considered. The general rule we are able to identify is that govern-
ment debt moves domestic capital and foreign asset in opposite direction, but the
direction in which each asset is moved is determined by the demographic typology.
The main finding for the SS economy is that higher debt, by redistributing
income from nonsavers to savers through taxation, increases savers’ consumption,
reduces their labor eﬀort and aggregate labor; this in turn contracts capital and
raises the stock of foreign bonds. Therefore in this case the receiver of financial
wealth displacement is solely capital stock.
These results are unchanged if the increase in debt is financed through a cut
of public spending.
In the model with OLG demographics, we discover that government debt cou-
pled with higher taxes, by depressing aggregate saving (as the usual intergen-
erational redistribution of income takes place) and consumption, increases labor
hours and hence crowds capital stock in (allowing for more investment and per-
manently higher output); foreign bond holding is reduced. In this circumstance,
5
the financial crowding out is entirely addressed to net foreign assets.
When a compensatory reduction in public spending finances the debt rise, no
eﬀects on capital stock and labor are registered; debt only crowds out net foreign
assets one for one.
2. SS demographics
2.1. The model
Consider a real small open economy that produces a single tradable good, which is
perfectly substitutable with the foreign-produced good and faces a perfect world
capital market.
The economy is populated by two types of households: savers and nonsavers.7
Savers and nonsavers belong to the same generation as they are both infinitely-
lived. Savers decide on consumption, labor supply and financial wealth accumu-
lation as well as portfolio composition. Financial wealth is composed of capital
stock K, government bonds D, and net foreign assets B. Nonsavers choose only
consumption, as they do not accumulate wealth and supply labor inelastically.
Both agents pay lump-sum taxes for financing government expenditures.
Government decisions on debt and on how to split the burden of taxation
between savers and nonsavers are considered to be exogenous.
7See Mankiw (2000). Although we will always speak of the SS, i.e. ”savers-spenders”,
economy, we prefer to use the term nonsavers instead of spenders.
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The representative agent of the saver-type makes consumption, CS, labor, LS,
and saving decisions in order to solve the following intertemporal problem
max
Z ∞
0
[α lnCS + (1− α) ln(1− LS)]e−ρtdt (1)
subject to the flow budget constraint
CS+
.
D +
.
B= wLS +Π+ r∗(D +B)−QS (2)
and the initial conditions: D(0) = D0 and B(0) = B0. In the formulation of
problem (1)-(2) the undefined notation has to be interpreted as follows: w is the
real wage, Π represents real dividends distributed by firms to savers, r∗ denotes
the given world interest rate, QS represents lump-sum taxes levied on savers, ρ is
the exogenous rate of time preference and α ∈ (0, 1) a preference parameter. The
instantaneous utility function has been assumed logarithmic for simplicity.
The necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the optimality problem (1)-(2) are
αC−1S = λ (3a)
(1− α)(1− LS)−1 = λw (3b)
.
λ= −λ(r∗ − ρ) (3c)
where λ represents the shadow value of wealth in the form of government bonds
and net foreign assets. The flow budget constraint (2) and the transversality
condition lim
t→∞
λ(D +B)e−ρt = 0 must also be satisfied at the optimum.
7
Since in equation (3c) both r∗ and ρ are exogenous, the steady state equi-
librium can be reached if and only if r∗ = ρ; we assume that this condition is
satisfied. This implies that
.
λ= 0 and
λ =λ (3c’)
where λ represents the long-run value of the shadow value of wealth. This requisite
in turn implies that the transversality condition becomes
lim
t→∞
(D +B)e−r
∗t = 0 (3d)
Each member of the nonsaver group supplies labor inelastically8 and decides on
consumption, CN , in order to maximize the lifetime utility function
R∞
0
(lnCN)e
−ρtdt
subject to the static budget constraint
CN = w
∼
LN −QN (4)
where
∼
LN is the exogenous labor supply of nonsavers and QN represents lump-
sum taxes paid by nonsavers. Savers and nonsavers are paid the same wage as
their labor is assumed to be perfectly substitutable.
The optimality program of nonsavers, being de facto a static problem, is de-
scribed by equation (4).
8Nonsavers’ endogenous labor decisions would not change qualitatively the results if their
tastes for the consumption-leisure trade-oﬀ are less elastic of those of savers with respect to the
consumption-wage ratio.
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Firms behave competitively in the output and factor markets. They produce
output Y by using capital and labor L according to the linearly homogeneous
technology Y = F (K,L) = Lf(k), where f is the output-labor ratio and k =
K
L
is the capital-labor ratio. This production function satisfies the conventional
properties of regularity.
There exist installation costs for changing capital. These adjustment costs are
described by the function Φ( I
K
), where I represents the investment rate, i.e.
.
K,
and Φ(0) = 0, Φ0(0) = 0, Φ0 > 0 for I 6= 0, and Φ00 > 0.
The representative firm maximizes the present discounted value of profits net
of investment expenditures. Net profits are: Π = F (K,L) − wL − I − Φ( I
K
).
Hence the intertemporal optimization problem of the firm is
max
Z ∞
0
Πe−r∗tdt
subject to I =
.
K, the definition of Π and the initial condition K(0) = K0.
First order conditions for the maximum profit entail
Φ0(
.
K
K
) + 1 = q (5a)
.
q= r∗q − FK(K,L) (5b)
FL(K,L) = w (5c)
plus the proper transversality condition. q represents the shadow price of capital.
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Total amount of labor employed by firms must be equal to the sum of labor
supplied by the two types of individuals, that is
L = LS+
∼
LN (6)
Equation (6) ensures the equilibrium on the labor market.
The government dynamic budget constraint is
.
D= G+ r∗D −Q (7)
where G is government consumption expenditure and Q = QS + QN represents
total lump-sum taxes levied on the two types of agents. The government deficit,
given by public expenditure plus interest payments on government debt less lump-
sum taxes, can be financed by issuing new debt. However we assume that the
government keeps the debt level fixed at
∼
D and maintains the budget balanced
through the endogenous adjustment of either lump-sum taxesQ or public spending
G.
Furthermore, we assume that each type of household pays a fixed proportion
of total lump-sum taxes:
QN = τQ (8a)
QS = (1− τ )Q (8b)
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where τ ∈ (0, 1) represents the proportion of total lump-sum taxes paid by non-
savers; τ is exogenously determined by the policymaker.
Finally, the balance of payments must be considered
.
B= Y + r∗B − CS − CN −G− I − Φ(
I
K
) (9)
According to equation (8), the current account, namely national income less ab-
sorption, gives the rate of accumulation of foreign bonds.
The complete macroeconomic model is obtained by combining the optimality
conditions for savers, nonsavers, and firms with the government budget constraint
and the current account equation.
Equations (3a), (3b) and (3c’) may be solved -once equations (5c) and (6) are
employed- for CS and LS in terms of λ and K as follows:
CS = CS(λ), C 0S = −α λ
−2
< 0; (10a)
LS = LS(λ, K), LS,λ =
(1− LS)FL
λ [FL − (1− LS)FLL]
> 0;
LS,K =
FLK
[FL − (1− LS)FLL]
> 0; (10b)
where overbar variables denote long-run equilibrium values.
Using the above short-run solutions for CS and LS toghether with equation (6),
equations (5a) and (5b) can be easily reduced to the following pair of diﬀerential
equations linearized around the steady state
11


.
K
.
q

 =


0 K /Φ00
j21 r
∗




K− K
q − 1

 (11)
where
j21 = −
FLFKK
[FL − (1− LS)FLL]
> 0.
Since the determinant of the coeﬃcient matrix in (11), given by | J |=
K
Φ00
FLFKK
[FL − (1− LS)FLL]
, is negative, the long-run equilibrium is a saddle-point sta-
ble, since K evolves continuously, while q is a jump variable -i.e. q(0) is free.9
The stable solution to system (11) is given by
K =K +(K0− K)eη1t (12a)
q = 1 + η1Φ00(K− K) (12b)
where η1<0 denotes the stable eigenvalue of the Jacobian in (11).
The determination of the solution for B can be obtained as follows.10 In-
serting equations (10) into equation (9), linearizing around the steady state and
substituting out the expression (K− K) through equation (12a), we obtain
.
B= Θ(K0− K)eη1t + r∗(B− B)
where Θ = r∗ +
FLK
h
FL(1−
∼
LN)− LS
∼
LN FLL
i
[FL − (1− LS)FLL]
− η1 K> 0.
9The existence of convex installation costs for changing capital stock represents a necessary
condition to have a well-defined long-run equilibrium and non-degenerate dynamics.
10See Turnovsky (1997).
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If the initial condition B(0) = B0 is satisfied, the solution to this equation is
B =B +
Θ
(η1 − r∗)
(K0− K)eη1t + Σer
∗t
where Σ = B0− B −
Θ
(η1 − r∗)
(K0− K).
The transversality condition (3d), which becomes under the hypothesis of a
fixed stock of government debt a ”no Ponzi games” condition (henceforth NPG)
on net foreign assets, implies that Σ = 0; that is
B0 =B +
Θ
(η1 − r∗)
(K0− K) (13’)
Therefore the short-run solution for B consistent with NPG is
B =B +
Θ
(η1 − r∗)
(K− K) (13”)
The steady state solvency of the economy implies that there exists a negative
relationship between capital stock (investment) and net foreign assets (the current
account).
2.2. Long-run eﬀects of government debt
Our study of the macroeconomic consequences of public debt is solely concerned
with the steady state equilibrium, when
.
B=
.
K= 0 and q = 1.
In the long-run, the economy can be succinctly described by the system
1− LS=
(1− α)
αω∗ CS (14a)
13
CN= ω∗
∼
LN −τ(G+ r∗
∼
D) (14b)
K= κ∗
³
LS +
∼
LN
´
(14c)
r∗
³
K + B
´
+ ω∗
³
LS +
∼
LN
´
=CS + CN +G (14d)
B= B0 +
Θ
(η1 − r∗)
(K −K0) (14e)
where ω∗ = f(κ∗)− κ∗f 0(κ∗) =w and κ∗ = f 0−1(r∗).
According to equation (14c), in the long-run capital intensity is uniquely de-
termined by the world interest rate since the production function is linearly ho-
mogeneous. Therefore the capital-labor ratio is independent of the government
debt, and aggregate labor and capital move in the same direction and by the same
proportion. Long-run wage rate w is also given at ω∗.
A clear understanding of the model can be obtained by substituting LS from
(14c) into (14a); we then get
CS=
αω∗
(1− α)(1+
∼
LN −
K
κ∗ ) (15a)
This equation represents the labor market clearing condition, incorporating the
capital market equilibrium, i.e. FK = f
0 = r∗. Equation (15a) describes a negative
relationship between K and CS as an increase in capital stock by raising labor
14
demand of firms requires higher labor supplied by savers (as nonsavers supply
labor inelastically) that must be associated through (14a) with lower consumption
of savers.
Equation (15a) is represented in Fig. 1 as the LM schedule. This downward-
sloping schedule is unaﬀected by government debt shocks.
Insert Fig. 1
Substituting equations (14b), (14c), and (14e) respectively for CN , LS +
∼
LN
and B into equation (14d), we obtain
CS= τ(G+ r∗
∼
D)−G+
·
r∗ +
ω∗
κ∗ +
r∗Θ
(η1 − r∗)
¸
K +Γ (15b)
where Γ = r∗
·
B0 −
Θ
(η1 − r∗)
K0
¸
− ω∗
∼
LN .
Equation (15b) describes the combinations of consumption of savers and capi-
tal stock that ensure the equilibrium of the current account compatible with NPG
and the capital market equilibrium. According to this equation, a rise in capital
stock increases labor and domestic output and reduces through (14e) the stock
of net foreign assets; since national income raises after the increase in capital,11
a compensatory increase in consumption of savers is needed in order to maintain
the current account balance equal to zero. Equation (15b) is depicted in Fig. 1
as the CA-NPG schedule.
11This is because r∗ +
ω∗
κ∗ +
r∗Θ
(η1 − r∗)
> 0.
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For a given capital stock (and hence total labor), an increase in government
debt by reducing consumption of nonsavers, as some fraction of the taxes that
service the debt will fall on them, and home absorption, calls for an increase in
consumption of savers in order to keep the current account in equilibrium; this
implies that an increase in
∼
D moves the CA-NPG schedule upward. The same
type of shift for the CA-NPG schedule is observed when a reduction of G takes
place.
The intersection of the two schedules at point E in Fig. 1 describes the pre-
shock macroeconomic equilibrium.
2.2.1. Lump-sum tax financing
Firstly, we assume that the debt shock is accompanied by the endogenous adjust-
ment of lump-sum taxes levied on savers and nonsavers.
We use the diagram of Fig. 1 to illustrate the long-run eﬀect of an increase in
∼
D .
An increase in public debt causes, by shifting the CA-NPG schedule up and
to the left, a reduction of capital stock and a rise in steady state consumption of
16
savers.12 In Fig. 1 the new equilibrium is at point E0.
The intuition behind these results is simple. Consumption of nonsavers is
reduced by the higher government debt as it lowers their disposable income. In
fact, as the experiment assumes that the tax burden is spread across agents, a
portion τ of lump-sum taxes necessary to finance the higher interest payments
on debt is levied on nonsavers, who do not hold government bonds and do not
receive the ”interest gift” from the government.
Lump-sum taxes paid by savers for financing an additional dollar of govern-
ment debt, (1− τ)r∗, are lower than the benefits of public debt, r∗, as nonsavers
are making their tax contributions of τr∗. Therefore, government debt raises the
disposable income of savers as they obtain a net income of τr∗
∼
D, by holding an
amount
∼
D of government bonds.
The net transfer of income brought about by government debt in favor of
savers induces these agents to demand more leisure and supply less labor; therefore
aggregate labor is reduced and capital stock crowded out.
Domestic output, national income and aggregate demand are reduced as well.13
12The respective multipliers are:
d K
d
∼
D
= −τr
∗
∆ < 0;
d CS
d
∼
D
=
ταr∗ω∗
(1− α)κ∗∆ > 0;
where ∆ = ω
∗
(1− α)κ∗ + r
∗ +
r∗Θ
(η1 − r∗)
> 0.
13The multiplier for national income (as well as aggregate demand) is:
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The stock of net foreign assets is increased because of the long-run solvency of
the economy.
Let Z denote national wealth, namely domestic capital plus net foreign assets.
Public debt displaces national wealth; the crowding out may be larger or smaller
than one for one.14
The redistribution of income across households also implies an intragener-
ational welfare redistribution. In fact, welfare of nonsavers is unambiguously
lowered by higher government debt, because of the reduction in their consump-
tion. The opposite occurs for savers as their consumption of goods and leisure is
increased.
Finally, note that the eﬀects of higher debt on capital stock, labor and con-
sumption in this small open economy replicates qualitatively the results for the
corresponding closed economy.
2.2.2. Government spending financing
Consider a second type of experiment: a rise in government debt accompanied by
a reduction of government spending in order to balance the budget.
In this case, since G +r∗
∼
D is fixed, the debt disturbance impacts on the
d(Y +r∗ B)
d
∼
D
= −τr
∗
∆
·
ω∗
κ∗ + r
∗ +
r∗Θ
(η1 − r∗)
¸
< 0.
14The national wealth multiplier is:
d Z
d
∼
D
= −τr
∗
∆ [1 +
Θ
(η1 − r∗)
] ≷ −1.
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macroeconomic equilibrium entirely through the reduction of public spending.
The eﬀects of the debt shock remain qualitative the same as before as it is evident
by looking at equation (15b). The CA-NPG of Fig. 1 is still moved upward and
to the left.
In the current and previous experiments debt manipulations imply a change
of opposite sign in the absorption of the economy. While in the previous case the
reduction of aggregate demand comes from the reduction of nonsavers’ consump-
tion, now the reduction of aggregate demand stems from the shrink of G.15
Finally, note that also the results obtained under the current financing regime
confirm those observed in the closed economy.
3. OLG demographics
3.1. The model
Consider the real small open economy of section 2 with a diﬀerent demographic
structure. Population is now composed of overlapping-generations continuously
entering the economy and having no intergenerational bequest motive. The
continuous-time OLG model of Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985), extended to
include an endogenous labor supply as in Phelps (1994), is adopted.
15The only diﬀerence between the eﬀects of debt shocks under the two financing regime is
merely quantitative: the public spending financing amplifies the eﬀects of a debt shock on the
whole macroeconomic system compared to the case of lump-sum tax financing (provided that
τ < 1).
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Individuals face uncertainty on the duration of their lives, since they face a
constant probability of death θ. In every instant of time, a large new cohort is
born. Population, composed of the cohorts of all ages, remains constant, since
the birth rate is assumed to equal the death rate.
Assuming logarithmic preferences at individual level, the aggregate behavior
of consumers is described by16
.
C= (r∗ − ρ)C − βθ(θ + ρ)A (16a)
1− L = (1− β)Cβw (16b)
.
A= r∗A+ wL−Q− C (16c)
where A is the stock of financial wealth, i.e. A = K + D + B, β is a positive
preference parameter and other variables and parameters are easily understood.
Equation (16a) represents the Blanchard-Yaari ”modified golden rule”.17 This
equation can be seen as the intertemporal arbitrage relationship between the
return on consumption, i.e. ρ +
.
C
C
+ βθ(θ + ρ)A
C
, and the return on saving, i.e.
16See Appendix A for the derivation of the demand-side of the model.
17As we assume that the stock of financial wealth is strictly positive (that is, if B is negative,
it is not too negative), the steady state equilibrium requires r∗ > ρ. This condition guarantees
that individuals save initially more and have an increasing profile of consumption.
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r∗. Equation (16b) is the labor supply and (16c) represents the private budget
constraint in aggregate terms.
Since we study our economy in the long-run equilibrium and the OLG demo-
graphics ensure per se the existence of a unique stationary position and a single
convergent path, we assume for simplicity that capital accumulation does not in-
volve installation costs; this implies that the shadow price of capital is always
equal to one. Such as an assumption has no consequences on the steady state
equilibrium, which is the focus of our analysis.
Using the same production function as before, the first order conditions for
the maximum profit entail: f 0(k) = r∗ and f(k) − kf 0(k) = w, where k = K
L
.
From the input demands, the following relationships are obtained
K
L
= κ∗ (17a)
w =w= ω∗ (17b)
where ω∗ and κ∗ are constant defined above.
The rest of the model is the same as before.
The government budget constraint, whose features and underlying assump-
tions have been described in Section 2.1, implies Q = G+ r∗
∼
D, while the balance
of payments can be written by using (17) as
.
B= r∗(K +B) + ω∗L−C −G−
.
K.
The complete short-run macroeconomic model exhibits saddle-point stability
21
if θ(θ + ρ) > r∗(r∗ − ρ).18
3.2. Long-run eﬀects of government debt
The long-run economy is given by the system
C=
βθ(θ + ρ)
(r∗ − ρ) A (18a)
1− L=
(1− β)
βω∗ C (18b)
K= κ∗ L (18c)
r∗ A +ω∗ L=C +G+ r∗
∼
D (18d)
where A≡K + B +
∼
D.
After substituting A from (18a) into (18d) and using (18c) to eliminate L, the
following equation is obtained
C=
βθ(θ + ρ)
[βθ(θ + ρ)− r∗(r∗ − ρ)]
·
ω∗
κ∗ K −(G+ r
∗ ∼
D)
¸
(19a)
Equation (19a) describes a positive relationship between consumption and
capital stock compatible with the Blanchard-Yaari asset market equilibrium and
18See Appendix B. This condition is easily satisfied under the reasonable assumption that the
in the aggregate the wage-bill exceeds lump-sum taxes, i.e. ω∗ L>Q.
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the current account balance.19 A rise in K by increasing domestic output and
national income requires higher consumption in order to keep the current account
balanced. This equation is depicted in Fig. 2 and labelled the CA-BY schedule.
Insert Fig. 2
A higher government debt lowers consumption for a given capital stock by
reducing consumers’ disposable income because of the higher taxes, and shifts the
CA-BY schedule down and on the right.
By substituting out L from equation (18c) into the optimal consumption-
leisure trade-oﬀ, we obtain the labor market equilibrium schedule
C=
βω∗
(1− β)(1−
K
κ∗ ) (19b)
Equation (19b) is downward-sloping in the C − K plane; it corresponds to the
LM schedule of Fig. 2. A change in fiscal variables does not aﬀect this functional
relationship.
Equation (19a) can be used toghether with equation (19b) to describe the
long-run eﬀects of government debt on aggregate consumption and capital stock.
The complete steady state equilibrium is illustrated in Fig. 2.
19Note that the assumption ω∗ L>Q ensures that βθ(θ + ρ)− r∗(r∗ − ρ) > 0.
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3.2.1. Lump-sum tax financing
We begin by studying the case of lump-sum tax financing. An increase in govern-
ment debt causes a shift in the CA-BY schedule down and to the right. In Fig.
2, the long-run equilibrium moves from E to E0. The eﬀect of the rise in
∼
D is for
K to rise and for C to fall.20
The higher public debt decreases aggregate saving because a part of the addi-
tional tax burden necessary to finance the interest payments on debt are paid by
future yet unborn generations. The reduction of national saving causes a fall in
private financial wealth, which in turn contracts consumption. National income
and aggregate demand may fall or rise.21 The drop in C increases labor hours
and deepens capital formation.
The reduction of consumption leads to a fall in net foreign assets, which is
greater than the rise of K +
∼
D.
20The respective multipliers are:
d K
d
∼
D
=
(1− β)r∗θ(θ + ρ)κ∗/ω∗
[θ(θ + ρ)− r∗(r∗ − ρ)] > 0;
d C
d
∼
D
= − βr
∗θ(θ + ρ)
[θ(θ + ρ)− r∗(r∗ − ρ)] < 0.
21The national income multiplier is
d(Y +r∗ B)
d
∼
D
=
r∗ [(1− β)θ(θ+ ρ)− r∗(r∗ − ρ)]
[θ(θ + ρ)− r∗(r∗ − ρ)] ≷ 0.
This multiplier is negative (positive) if Q + C< (>)ω∗.
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Public debt crowds out national wealth, i.e. the sum of physical capital and
net foreign assets, more than one for one; this occurs because the interest rate is
greater than the rate of time discount.22
The eﬀects of government debt on financial wealth are rather conventional,
even if they are greatly simplified, compared to the closed economy, by the fac-
tor prices’ invariance. What turns out to be rather unconventional in this open
economy setup are the consequences upon factors’ employment.23
The consequences of government debt on capital stock sharply contrasts with
the result obtained in an OLG closed economy and in SS economies with an
endogenous labor supply.
The motivation for our findings is to be found in the hypothesis of overlapping-
generations with new entries combined with the tax revenue distribution scheme
adopted, on the one side, and the small open economy environment, on the other
side. When there are finite lives with new births, government debt aﬀects the
saving-consumption decision at aggregate level.
22The multiplier for national wealth is
d Z
d
∼
D
= − θ(θ + ρ)
[θ(θ + ρ)− r∗(r∗ − ρ)] < −1.
The same quantitative result holds for a small open economy with an inelastic labor supply
and hence an invariant capital stock. See Blanchard (1985).
23As it has been emphasized in the Introduction, there is a close similarity with Obstfeld (1990)
findings for a small open economy, i.e. a positive eﬀect of public debt on capital formation and
a negative eﬀect on net foreign assets; our setup has nearly the same demographics of Obstfeld
but a radically diﬀerent structure of the supply-side.
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Since young people save more than old people, a redistribution of wealth among
generations (caused by the increase in lump-sum taxation) occurs, in particular
between the living generations and the still unborn generations; the current gen-
eration bears only a part of the tax burden. Saving is reduced by the tax hike;
as a consequence financial wealth is reduced as well, bringing consumption down.
But since factor prices are given, lower consumption imply through labor supply
higher labor hours, which in turn, given capital intensity, leads to higher capital
stock.
3.2.2. Government spending financing
If the parametric increase of debt is a accompanied by a compensatory reduction in
government spending, such thatG +r∗
∼
D is fixed, no eﬀects on consumption, labor
hours, capital stock and financial wealth are registered. As financial wealth remain
unchanged, the higher government debt reflects only on the foreign component of
wealth, leading to a complete crowding out of foreign assets, i.e.
d B
d
∼
D
= −1.
Also in this case, we depart from an OLG closed economy, where this type of
shock generates the same qualitative eﬀects of a change in debt financed through
taxation24 and SS economies
4. Concluding remarks
24See Marini-Van der Ploeg (1988) for the case of inelastic labor-leisure choices. Their results
carry over when labor is supplied endogenously.
26
In this article we have investigated the steady state consequences of government
debt on capital formation, financial wealth and labor in a small open economy
with endogenous labor decisions.
The analysis has focused on the role played by two alternative types of de-
mographic heterogeneity: An intragenerational heterogeneity and an intergener-
ational one. The two types of demographics that characterize our non-Ricardian
world are the ”savers-spenders” demographics and the overlapping-generations
with new entries ones.
We discover that the financial crowding out morphology when the asset menu
is supplemented by an additional asset, i.e. net foreign assets, depends on the
type of demographics. Our results diﬀer substantially from those seen in a closed
economy with an elastic labor supply, where the type of demographic heterogene-
ity plays no qualitative role for the final consequences of debt on wealth and factor
employment.
The general findings indicate the existence of a trade-oﬀ between capital and
outside financial wealth in response to government debt manipulations. While
the SS economy predicts that debt crowds out capital and increases net foreign
assets, the OLG economy is characterized by the exact opposite results.
The behavior of consumption is responsible for the diﬀerentiated consequences
of debt shocks under the two types of demographics. In fact a change in consump-
tion modifies in opposite direction labor supply, which in turn, because of the fixed
capital intensity, moves capital stock in the same direction.
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While in the SS economy debt, by raising the tax bill on every agent, pushes
savers to increase consumption, reduces hours worked and hence aggregate capital,
in the OLG economy debt by contracting saving and financial wealth depresses
aggregate consumption and results in higher labor eﬀort and capital stock.
The financing procedure of debt manipulations is immaterial in the case of SS
demographics, while it is not immaterial in the case of an OLG structure. In fact,
in the latter demographics, the public spending financing of debt shock is neutral.
What can be said about an integrated SS-OLG demographics, where the dy-
achronous heterogeneity is combined with the synchronous one?
In a composite SS-OLG demographic setup the results seen for the OLG econ-
omy are qualitatively confirmed.25 This mean that the eﬀects of debt on capital,
labor and net foreign assets seen in the OLG case prevail over those obtained
in the SS one. This is contrary to the closed economy findings of Evans (1991),
where also for a composite demographics it is established that debt crowds out
capital stock.
In this integrated demographics, the eﬀect of debt are reduced comparatively
to the simple OLG economy by the proportion of the tax-bill that falls on savers.
Debt becomes neutral in terms of consumption, labor and capital when nonsavers
are required to pay the entire burden of taxation for financing the rise of the
government debt service.
25See Appendix C.
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APPENDICES
A. OLG demographics: Derivation of the demand-side
Here, we provide a derivation of the aggregate behavior of consumers described
by system (16) in Section 3.1.
Assume that instantaneous preferences of each consumer are logarithmic. The
consumer born at time s 6 t maximizes the following expected lifetime welfare
Z ∞
t
{β ln c(s, j) + (1− β) ln [z − l(s, j)]} e−(θ+ρ)(j−t)dj (A.1)
subject to the flow budget constraint
da(s, t)
dt
= (r∗ + θ)a(s, t) + w(t)l(s, t)− q(s, t)− c(s, t) (A.2)
and the solvency condition precluding ”Ponzi games”
lim
j→∞
a(j, t)e−(r
∗+θ)(j−t) = 0 (A.3)
where c(s, t), l(s, t), a(s, t), and q(s, t) denote at time t consumption of goods,
labor hours, nonhuman wealth, and lump-sum taxes of a consumer born at time
s, respectively; w(t) denotes the real wage at time t; z, ρ and r∗ are the individ-
ual time endownment, the exogenous rate of time preference and the real world
interest rate, respectively; β ∈ (0, 1) is a preference parameter.
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The budget constraint (A.2) incorporates the hypothesis that consumers re-
ceive an actuarially fair premium θa(s, t) from competitive life insurance compa-
nies and give all their wealth to the life insurance companies contingent on their
death.
By integrating the budget constraint (A.2) forward and using the condition
(A.3), we obtain the consumer’s intertemporal budget constraintZ ∞
t
c(s, j)e−(r
∗+θ)(j−t)dj = a(s, t) + h(s, t)
where h(s, t) represents human wealth. This is defined as
h(s, t) =
Z ∞
t
[w(j)l(s, j)− q(s, j)]e−(r∗+θ)(j−t)dj
The first-order conditions for the individual problem (A.1)-(A.3) are
z − l(s, t) = (1− β)c(s, t)βw(t)
dc(s, t)
dt
= (r∗ − ρ)c(s, t)
The forward integration of the Euler equation for individual consumption and
the joint use of the intertemporal budget constraint yields the following consump-
tion function
c(s, t) = β(θ + ρ) [a(s, t) + h(s, t)]
Summing all over the choorts and omitting the time index, the aggregate
demand-side is described by
32
C = β(θ + ρ)(A+H) (A.4a)
1− L = (1− β)Cβw (A.4b)
.
H= (r∗ + θ)H − wL+Q (A.4c)
C+
.
A= r
∗A+ wL−Q (A.4d)
where capital letters denote aggregate variables of the corresponding lower-case
letters and the aggregate time endownment Z has been set equal to one.
¿From system (A.4), the Blanchard-Yaari dynamic equation for consumption
is easily obtained
.
C= (r
∗ − ρ)C − βθ(θ + ρ)A (A.4a’)
B. OLG demographics: Analysis of stability
The short-run model can be written as
1− L = (1− β)Cβω∗ (B.1a)
K = κ∗L (B.1b)
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.C= (r∗ − ρ)C − βθ(θ + ρ)(K +B+
∼
D) (B.1c)
.
B= f(κ∗)L− C −G−
.
K +r∗B (B.1d)
where ω∗ = f(κ∗)− κ∗f 0(κ∗) =w and κ∗ = f 0−1(r∗).
Equations (B.1a) and (B.1b) can be solved, once linearized around the steady
state, for L and K in terms of the dynamic variable C to yield
L = L(C), L0 = −(1− β)βω∗ < 0 (B.2a)
K = K(C), K 0 = −(1− β)κ
∗
βω∗ < 0 (B.2b)
Substituting out the values of L and K from equations (B.2a) and (B.2b) into
equations (B.1c) and (B.1d),26 the model can be reduced to the following pair of
diﬀerential equations linearized around the steady state

.
C
.
B

 =


j11 −βθ(θ + ρ)
j21 j22




C− C
B− B

 (B.3)
where
j11 = (r
∗ − ρ)− θ(θ + ρ)(1− β)κ
∗
ω∗ > 0;
j21 = −
(1− β)f
βω∗ − 1 +
·
(r∗ − ρ)− θ(θ + ρ)(1− β)κ
∗
ω∗
¸
(1− β)κ∗
βω∗ > 0;
26Equation (B.2b) is employed, once linearized, to eliminate both Kand
.
K from equations
(B.1c) and (B.1d).
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j22 = r
∗ − θ(θ + ρ)(1− β)κ
∗
ω∗ .
The coeﬃcient matrix of system (B.3) must have one positive eigenvalue as-
sociated with the jump variable, C, and one negative eigenvalue associated with
the predetermined variable, B. The determinant of the above Jacobian is given
by
| J |= −θ(θ + ρ) + r∗(r∗ − ρ) = (r
∗ − ρ)
β A
h
β(Q −ω∗ L)− (1− β) C
i
< 0.
This determinant is unambiguously negative, as we can reasonably assume that
ω∗ L>Q, and hence the required condition for saddle-point stability is satisfied.
C. SS-OLG demographics
When the SS demographics is combined with the OLG one, the corresponding
long-run economy is described by
CS=
γθ(θ + ρ)
(r∗ − ρ) A (C.1a)
1− LS=
(1− γ)
γω∗ CS (C.1b)
CN= ω∗
∼
LN −τ(G+ r∗
∼
D) (C.1c)
r∗ A +ω∗(LS +
∼
LN ) =CS + CN +G+ r
∗ ∼
D (C.1d)
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K= κ∗(LS +
∼
LN) (C.1e)
where γ is a preference parameter and A≡K + B +
∼
D.
In this context, savers are Blanchard-Yaari agents, while nonsaver remain Key-
nesian agents.
By operating as in section 3, the core model can be described by the following
system
CS=
γθ(θ + ρ)
[γθ(θ + ρ)− r∗(r∗ − ρ)]
·
ω∗
κ∗ K −(1− τ)(G+ r
∗ ∼D)− ω∗
∼
LN
¸
(C.2a)
CS=
γω∗
(1− γ)(1+
∼
LN −
K
κ∗ ) (C.2b)
Equations (C.2) give immediately the perception that the basic results for
capital and financial wealth of the OLG demographics are qualitatively confirmed.
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